Pages 1 - 32

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA

BEFORE THE HONORABLE RICHARD SEEBORG, JUDGE

MICHAEL ZELENY,

Plaintiff,

VS.

NO. C 17-7357 RS

EDMUND G. BROWN, JR., et al.,

Defendants.

San Francisco, California

Thursday, June 13, 2019

TRANSCRIPT OF PROCEEDINGS

APPEARANCES:

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BY: ROGER A. LANE, ESQ.

Reported By: BELLE BALL, CSR 8785, CRR, RDR

Official Reporter, U.S. District Court

Thursday - June 13, 2019

1:42 p.m.

PROCEEDINGS

THE CLERK: Calling Case C-17-7357, Zeleny versus Brown. Counsel, please come forward and state your appearances.

MR. ROBINSON: Good morning, Your Honor. Damion Robinson for plaintiff Michael Zeleny.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. ROBINSON: Good afternoon; I apologize.

MR. LANE: Good afternoon, Your Honor. I'm Roger

Lane of Foley & Lardner for the moving party on defendant New

Enterprise Associates.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. LANE: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So this matter is on for the motion to dismiss the first amended complaint, and against -- to the extent it's against NEA in its claims, I believe, 6 and 7.

It appeared there were three issues we really need to talk about, or at least this comes down to. The statute of limitations question; the Noerr-Pennington issue with respect to the sixth claim, the 1983 claim; and then whether or not we've got a protected class properly identified for purposes of the 1985 claim.

So, I can tell you that I have read through your papers.

I can give you a little bit of an indication of how I think it

shakes out. But certainly, you can address all of these things.

The statute of limitations question kind of boils down at the end to delayed discovery, and whether or not there is a -- an argument here that there was some basis to claim delayed discovery. Because on its face, there's some -- there doesn't appear to be any overt act after March 29th of 2017, when -- which would be kind of the triggering event.

That said, I'm not -- right now, as I sit here, I'm not inclined to think the statute of limitations is the -- is a basis to grant the motion.

That said, on the other two I am more inclined to -- the notion that granting the motion is appropriate. On the Noerr-Pennington claim, I think the bulk of that, the NEA is right, with respect to Noerr-Pennington.

The one question I have, and you will -- perhaps can ask, focus on this, counsel for NEA, is the argument that NEA falsely told the police that Mr. Zeleny was using drugs to -- according to the complaint, to justify the seizure of his weapon. Whether or not that would have any kind of Noerr-Pennington protection to it, or why that otherwise isn't something I have to worry about.

Finally, with respect to the 1985 claim, I do think there is a problem on the seventh claim for relief, to the extent that there really isn't a suspected -- suspect classification

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that's identified. I don't know lawful gun owner or those who
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    protest violence against women are protected classes. And so,
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     I think the 1985 claim has a real problem.
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          So the defendant NEA is the moving party, so I'll let you
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    begin. So Mr. Lane?
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               MR. LANE:
                          Thank you, Your Honor. I appreciate your
      providing time for us to be heard.
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          Let me start with the Noerr-Pennington question that you
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    have, if you wish.
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               THE COURT: Sure.
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               MR. LANE: And I'm just trying to find very quickly
      where that arises in the pleading.
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               THE COURT: Well, I had it noted in my notes, but I
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      don't have a cite reference --
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               MR. LANE:
                          Okay.
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               THE COURT: -- for you. I do think -- and so as an
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      initial matter, is it your understanding, you don't think that
      that is -- that averment is made?
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               MR. LANE: I do not think that averment is made.
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               THE COURT: Okay.
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               MR. LANE: And in fact, I think when you look at it,
      what you see is that an averment is made that false
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      information was reported. Sort of passive voice.
                                                         It's not
      alleged that NEA did it. NEA didn't do it. I can tell you
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      that.
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And that's not here on a pleadings motion, but it caught
my eye because -- it caught my eye that it was not actually
averred that NEA did that.
     Now, if Mr. Robinson can point me to the paragraph, I
could be more concisely responsive to Your Honor, more directly
responsive.
          THE COURT: And you're now talking about the question
 that I had about --
          MR. LANE:
                    That's right.
          THE COURT: -- advising the police with respect to
 the claim of drug -- drug use.
                       It's 139(a), Your Honor. And it
          MR. ROBINSON:
 alleges NEA falsely accused Zeleny of using drugs.
          THE COURT: Okay. Does it say anything about it --
 then telling the police of that?
          MR. ROBINSON: Yes. Well, NEA falsely accused Zeleny
 of using drugs, which the City believed it could use to seize
 Zeleny's firearms.
                    I see that now averred, so I stand
          MR. LANE:
 corrected. Thank you for that.
     Your Honor, under the Noerr-Pennington doctrine, if a
private party calls on police out of concern, to report a
concern that they have, whether it's well-founded or
ill-founded, that's classic petitioning activity.
          THE COURT: How about, though, if it's -- in this
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instance, it's averred that it's just deceptive. I mean, is 1 there any Noerr-Pennington protection if you intentionally lie 2 to the police? 3 That, I -- Your Honor, with your leave, 4 MR. LANE: 5 that, I would have to research. Because I don't think we 6 focused on that particular issue. 7 THE COURT: You didn't interpret that averment to be making that claim. 8 MR. LANE: No. We interpret it to be there was a 9 report of drug use by Zeleny that the police used for this 10 11 reason. THE COURT: Well, let me ask. Go to Mr. Robinson. 12 13 Are you -- is the nature of your averment that NEA had no reason to believe Mr. Zeleny was engaging in drug use, but they 14 15 so advised -- tipped off -- the police, and apparently for the reason that they wanted the police to seize his weapon? 16 17 MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor. And, and to be a bit careful, I have not looked at the email that that stems from, 18 19 before today's hearing. But, yes. The context and the 20 substance of what was being said is: Here is -- you know, Zeleny is using drugs; you can use this to take his firearms 21 22 away. 23 THE COURT: And your claim is that NEA had no reason

MR. ROBINSON: No legitimate reason, Your Honor.

to believe that to be true.

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THE COURT: Okay. Well, let's stay with the sixth 1 claim for relief. And that was a -- that was a particular 2 question I had with respect to Noerr-Pennington. But more 3 generally, if you wanted to talk about Noerr-Pennington, go 4 5 ahead, Mr. Lane. 6 MR. LANE: I'm happy to do so, Your Honor. And allow 7 me just a moment to flip to my notes. (Reporter interruption) 8 Oh, forgive me. Am I too guiet? MR. LANE: 9 been accused of that. 10 11 THE COURT: That's seldom something that people get accused of in this courtroom. 12 MR. LANE: And counsel. 13 THE COURT: So, I don't mind if counsel is too quiet. 14 15 Go ahead. MR. LANE: Your Honor, the Noerr-Pennington doctrine 16 applies to any concerted effort to sway public officials, as 17 18 the Court knows. And this is so, regardless of the private 19 citizen's motive or intent. And it includes advocating one's 20 point of view regarding one's business or economic interests. 21 It is not limited to political issues. 22 So in this case, submitting information to a legislative 23 committee or advocating that the City do so, meeting with City personnel to air grievances, to express concerns, to seek to 24

have them take action as to matters with which you take issue

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is all core First-Amendment petitioning activity. 1 THE COURT: Then we have the sham exception. 2 MR. LANE: And then we have the sham exception. And 3 here, plaintiff -- pardon me, defendant -- or plaintiff, 4 5 that's right. I'm all confused. 6 There are two key points here, Your Honor. Contrary to plaintiff's suggestion, where Noerr-Pennington immunity is at 7 issue, a plaintiff's complaint must contain specific 8 allegations that Noerr does not apply. It is not a 9 10 notice-pleading kind of issue. And that's in our law. 11 Here, the plaintiff specifically seeks to invoke the judicial sham exception, as you noted. And that requires 12 pleading one of three things. Advocacy before a tribunal. 13 a pattern of submitting multiple petitions without regard to 14 15 their merit. 16 THE COURT: I suppose the first one is the one that would cover the argument, if such is being made, that you --17 18 you don't know that someone is a drug user, and you just claim 19 it just to get the governmental entity to do something. 20 And that's what I would seek leave to MR. LANE: 21 further look into and focus authority on that, if you wish, Your Honor. 22 23 **THE COURT:** Okay. I'd be happy to do that. And the -- and 24 MR. LANE: the final one is: Misrepresentations that deprive the 25

proceedings of their legitimacy. That is, untruths that led the tribunal astray.

Now, plaintiff's allegations do not even approach these criteria, we respectfully submit. There's no allegation that NEA even appeared at or participated in any quasi-judicial proceedings. And the allegations that NEA behind the scenes allegedly advocated for its interests with the City and others is classifying protected activity.

There's no allegation NEA ever appeared before the City Council, which is the relevant tribunal here; ever presented a paper; or advocated of anything to the City Council. So we don't see how the sham judicial exception could apply in these circumstances. It just doesn't fit, we submit.

THE COURT: Why don't I have Mr. Robinson talk about Noerr-Pennington.

MR. LANE: Very well.

THE COURT: And then we will go to the other issues.

MR. LANE: Thank you.

MR. ROBINSON: Thank Your Honor. I want to take up where Mr. Lane left off, which is the assertion that NEA did not engage in any advocacy before the tribunal. That's correct. NEA never engaged in any advocacy. I won't read you from the brief, because Mr. Lane just said the same thing. Never appeared at the City Council, never took part in the proceedings.

Noerr-Pennington depends on the exercise of a First

Amendment petitioning right. The reason there is a

Noerr-Pennington doctrine is to protect people who do things

like go to city council meetings and advocate their position.

Without a protected First Amendment activity, Noerr-Pennington does not apply.

Stepping a little bit further, the suggestion that what we are arguing about is NEA advocating to the City to do certain things in private meetings is not completely accurate.

What we have alleged, and I think -- I would suggest that we could further allege, based on the evidence, is that NEA and the City agreed to derail the permitting process. Not that they said: We're going to advocate for our position; you should deny the permit. There are good bases to do that.

What happened was that NEA and particularly Chief Bertini agreed: We're not going to let Zeleny make his way through the ordinary process of permitting. It's an attack on the process, not the outcome.

And Noerr-Pennington is designed to let people, whether it's commercial interests, very bad interests, whatever interests you want, to go in and advocate for a position, and use an official proceeding for its intended purpose. And you have extensive latitude to do that. You can take ridiculous positions, racist positions, some of the case law suggests. Whatever the motive is is not at issue. But what is at issue

is that the party claiming Noerr-Pennington immunity has to be using the proceedings to reach an outcome. Not subverting the proceedings, which is what occurred here.

And I want to take --

THE COURT: Well, but isn't the -- if I'm reading the averments correctly, part of what NEA is doing is they don't want open display of firearms near their offices. And so they are -- they are sincerely trying to have your client stop doing that.

Isn't that petitioning the governmental officials to, you know, take his permit away, or don't give him a permit, or -- isn't that kind of the heart of Noerr-Pennington?

MR. ROBINSON: So I think it's correct that they don't want Zeleny protesting outside their offices. There's no dispute about that.

THE COURT: But further than that, it's not just they don't like him. They don't want him -- they don't want people with -- openly displaying firearms near their facility.

MR. ROBINSON: I have no doubt that would be NEA's position. I -- I -- our focus is that it's the content of the message that's at issue. It's what Zeleny is protesting about. And NEA may disagree, and the City may disagree. But for Noerr-Pennington purposes I want to just focus on the first prong. So advocacy as part of a governmental process that's baseless and an attempt to stifle.

The permitting process was used to stifle Zeleny. It's not as though Zeleny went through an ordinary appeal process with the City. The process was delayed. The process was intercepted by Chief Bertini, who had these meetings and agreements with NEA, where they talk about finding a solution to Zeleny.

THE COURT: Well, the permitting issue, though, would only go the firearm, right? I know that, from what I've read here, his, his beef, if you will, with NEA is related back to this notion of someone who he thinks was associated with NEA that then abused that person's daughter. Right?

MR. ROBINSON: Right.

THE COURT: So the substance of that protest is separate and apart from firearm carriage. Isn't it?

MR. ROBINSON: It's the same protest. Meaning
Zeleny -- Mr. Zeleny is protesting, carrying the firearms.
And he's been doing that since 2010. That is part of his
protest. And --

THE COURT: Yeah, but I guess where I was going, where my question was going was I thought you were suggesting that NEA was conspiring with the government officials, sort of using the -- the gun-carrying question as a pretext, but what they are really trying to do is to stop this protest about this person and the person's daughter and that connection to NEA.

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               MR. ROBINSON:
                              That's correct, Your Honor.
                                                           The --
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               THE COURT: Which is correct?
               MR. ROBINSON: That the -- the firearm-open-carry ban
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      is being used for a content-based prohibition on Zeleny.
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      being used to prevent him from protesting this activity by --
               THE COURT: Why can't he then -- I mean, that's where
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      I'm -- the disconnect, I'm not quite seeing it. If they --
      they don't -- you agree with me that maybe one of the
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      motivations is: We don't want people with -- carrying
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      firearms around our building. Mr. Zeleny can still protest.
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      He can stand out there with a big sign that says:
      people are terrible because they harbor someone who abuses
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      their -- their daughter. They're not trying to stop him from
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      doing that. They're only trying to stop him from carrying the
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15
      weapon.
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               MR. ROBINSON: I -- that's not what we have alleged,
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      Your Honor. What we've alleged is that they are trying to
      stop him from carrying the signs and getting out his message.
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      And --
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               THE COURT: But his not getting a permit wouldn't
      stop him from -- he could still go out there with a big sign,
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      couldn't he?
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                          (Nods head)
               MR. LANE:
                              That's the City's position. But, with
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               MR. ROBINSON:
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      one caveat which is the City -- Chief Bertini has said:
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find your big sign offensive, and I'm going to prosecute you for obscenity if you bring your big sign.

THE COURT: That's a different issue.

MR. ROBINSON: It's all the within the context of the same protest. The carrying of firearms is part of his protest. He is carrying firearms to draw attention to the protest.

THE COURT: Well, okay. I understand that. But what I'm trying to focus on is -- is you sort of can't have it both ways. If your suggestion is NEA is -- doesn't -- is -- NEA is not acting in its sincere effort to stop firearms from being displayed around their building, what they're really doing is they're trying to silence Mr. Zeleny, but at the same time what they -- you say they are doing wouldn't silence him, it's a bit of the -- or at least, it wouldn't stop him from protesting; it's -- there's a disconnect there in my mind.

Now, I understand you somehow think they are inextricably interlinked, the firearm and the protest about this person.

And I'm having trouble understanding the linkage. The linkage to the extent that you're suggesting, if I'm reading the averments right, that there's this pretext of what they're really -- what NEA is complaining about.

And that's what I don't -- because I think at the end of the day, when I read your averments, and it says: NEA is engaged in petitioning the government officials because -- to

-- to not allow this person to display openly firearms around their building, that seems to me to be a legitimate protest -- or a legitimate petition.

And you sort of indicate: Yeah, they can take that position. But that's not -- then you're saying: But that's not what they are doing here. They're really trying to stop something different by using that tack.

Do you understand what I'm -- I know it was a garbled question, I apologize.

MR. ROBINSON: No, I understand Your Honor's question. And it's a fair point. And so what we've suggested is -- and what we allege in the pleading is that NEA's desire is to stop Zeleny's protest, based on the content. That's the allegation.

THE COURT: And the content being the dispute about this fellow and his daughter.

MR. ROBINSON: Correct.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. ROBINSON: And so, rather than petition the City and say, you know: Stop him from protesting, what's happened is that the -- the NEA and the City have essentially subverted the permitting process, itself. That's the allegation. So the way that this -- and have done so, in order to stop Zeleny because of the content of his message.

So that's the allegation, is that -- and the ways that

this happened were -- it wasn't as though NEA came to the City Council and said: Don't do this, or went to Bertini and said: Don't let him do this. What happened was that Bertini intercepted Zeleny's permit application. The City sat on it for an extended period of time, rather than processing it in the ordinary course. The City continued to pepper him with requests for information.

And I should say, sat on it for a length of time in order to allow other permits that Mr. Zeleny had to expire, so that he couldn't do the protest. Peppered him with questions and requests for information to -- that are never required.

People get these kind of permits by submitting a hand-drawn map that says: We'll have -- my favorite one was: We'll have yoga or some other activity. And the City rubber-stamped that. So it peppers him with questions: What kind of generator are you using? What kind of screen? How are you going to set this up? What kind of truck do you bring? And then uses that to create a set of excuses to delay, defer, and ultimately, deny.

That is not Noerr-Pennington. That is not somebody going and advocating for a body, publicly, privately or in any other capacity. It is NEA speaking with City officials, conspiring with City officials to use the process, rather than the outcome of that process, to stifle Zeleny's protest.

It's not a: We've advocated and we made

misrepresentations, or we got it wrong somehow and that resulted in an outcome that was wrong. That's not what we're arguing about. What we're arguing about is that the process has been conscripted as a tool to delay, defer, and ultimately, stop Zeleny, which is the object of the conspiracy that we allege, based in 2009, when the conspiracy started. And we have emails indicating that that was the aim of the conspiracy.

So the process is not being used as a legitimate administrative process to reach an outcome. It's being used to delay and defer and deny, on content-based grounds, to forestall Zeleny from resuming his protest. And that falls within the first prong of the Noerr-Pennington sham exception.

And in fairness, when we initially filed the first amended complaint, we didn't include all of the allegations about, you know, how the process specifically was subverted, and how the City officials didn't comply with standard procedures, and how things were completely outside of the bounds of the ordinary permitting process. The reason for that is that we were making the amendment by stipulation, so couldn't amend the substance of the allegations against the City. But I think we have more than sufficient facts to be able to do that.

And if Your Honor is inclined to rule based on the sham exception, I would suggest: Let us put all the facts in.

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lane.

MR. LANE: Your Honor, if I heard Mr. Robinson

correctly, the assertions he's now making about NEA's participation in the permit process are not in the pleading. And they are not.

The pleading does not allege that NEA did anything in the permitting process. It only alleges, I believe at the end of Paragraph 139(d), that NEA participated in meetings that resulted in a plan to try to deny Zeleny's application or appeal through the appeal process. Something to that effect. That's just an allegation that the conspiracy continued. It's generic and conclusory. It is not an allegation of any actionable overt act by NEA.

And so on its face --

THE COURT: So that's a statute-of-limitations issue.

MR. LANE: It is a statute-of-limitations issue.

It's also a failure-to-state-a-claim issue. Because if -- in the absence of an overt act, a general allegation that the conspiracy continued not only can't save it under the statute of limitations, but you've not alleged any actionable conduct on the part of NEA. All that's implicit in that is that there were discussions and meetings with the City. Or the police department, as the case may be. And that's classic immunized conduct, for NEA to go in and say, in words or substance:

There's been a fella outside our door who has enough ammo to shoot through our plate glass and kill everybody here. We would like that issue addressed in this environment of fatal

workplace and school violence.

Nothing that is unprotected under *Noerr* is alleged in this complaint. Nor, we submit, can it be.

THE COURT: On that last piece, Mr. Robinson is sort of saying, if I heard him correctly: Well, if you are inclined to go with the NEA side on that, he wants leave to amend.

MR. LANE: (Nods head)

THE COURT: And you're suggesting that he shouldn't be allowed to do that?

MR. LANE: I submit -- I know that this Court often gives the plaintiffs one chance to amend. Plaintiff here has already amended once. Granted, it was to add the claims against NEA for the first time.

What's unusual here, Your Honor, is plaintiff has had discovery from the City. The City produced its documents. Hundreds, thousands of pages. Mr. Zeleny's counsel deposed Commander Bertini. We produced NEA's documents under the terms of Judge -- Magistrate Judge Hixson's order. And those were turned over. And yet, all we see in this amended complaint is inadequate.

If the plaintiffs wanted to -- having had not just a chance to plead, but also to get pre-complaint discovery, it seems to us that that could be and should be the end of the story.

And when you add to that things like -- which we haven't come to yet, granted -- the 1985 issues, the statute-of-limitations issues, it -- this case needs to move forward. And we respectfully submit it would be appropriate if it moved forward without NEA. Because the core allegations are that the City denied Mr. Zeleny his permits, and that he did not prevail on appeals of that activity.

And after all this time, there's no allegation that NEA had its fingers on the scales in any inappropriate way. Other than expressing its concern for its people.

THE COURT: Okay. On the 1985 claim, the identification of a suspect class, I gave you sort of my tentative view that you've got a problem on that claim. So I'll give you an opportunity to address that one.

MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor, I think the case that we -- we cite, there is a Ninth Circuit case, Life Insurance Company versus Reichert (Phonetic), which suggests that -- it cites, with approval, I believe, a Sixth Circuit decision defining a class as people engaged in political protest.

And so that is --

THE COURT: Well, there's a problem with that being the support here for your position, because I think that case predated the -- what's developed in terms of the requirement on identifying the suspect class in the way it's now required. I would have to go back and look. But I'm pretty sure that

there's a timing problem with *Reichert* being the state of the law in the Circuit.

MR. ROBINSON: So the -- the Circuit has deviated from that view. It is -- Reichert is still on the books, it's still --

THE COURT: Well, Reichert is, but the -- what you're saying -- I mean, you're suggesting some earlier cases that we're talking about -- I think you relied on that Portland Feminist Women's Center case, Ninth Circuit case. And those cases have been more or less put aside, haven't they? I mean, they don't --

MR. ROBINSON: The recent authority is -- is to the effect that it needs to be a suspect class. The more recent authority goes that way. And I think we have -- you know, we put it in; we have our argument. I understand --

THE COURT: A candid argument. I appreciate that.

Okay. All right. And you, would you agree that if -- if that does apply, if you are required to identify a suspect class, you know, I admire your effort. But we really don't have that here. I mean, lawful gun owner group is not a suspect -- whatever one may say about that group, they're not a suspect class. And, and those -- you know, carving out a group that says people who protest against violence against women, you know, a good cause, but it's not a suspect class.

MR. ROBINSON: I'm trying to find a way, Your Honor,

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to gracefully submit on the tentative.
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               THE COURT: Okay. That's fine. You just did.
      That's good. I will -- I will accept your gracious
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      submission. I'll look at it again. But I think I understand
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      the arguments.
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          So the only thing we haven't covered yet is statute of
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     limitations.
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               MR. LANE:
                         Yes.
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               THE COURT: So go ahead, Mr. Lane.
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               MR. LANE: And Your Honor, would you like me to
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      address a particular issue, like the discovery order?
               THE COURT: Well, delayed discovery seemed to be this
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      safe harbor, if you will, for Mr. Robinson. I mean, there's
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      some -- I had some question about -- you know, you attached --
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      I'm looking at my notes when I went over this.
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          You attached as an exhibit the denial of Mr. Zeleny's last
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     appeal. And that was back August 29th, 2017. And do you want
     me to -- I assume that's what you want me to take judicial
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    notice of.
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               MR. LANE: Yes. Forgive me, Your Honor.
               THE COURT: Okay, so --
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               MR. LANE: We actually weren't requesting judicial
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      notice; we just offered it to the Court for clarity because
      the dates were all -- but we're fine with the Court taking
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      judicial notice.
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THE COURT: Okay. Fine. Actually, are you asking me, Mr. Robinson, to take judicial notice of this? Because you made reference to it too, according to my notes.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor. We would ask that you do take judicial notice of that.

THE COURT: Okay. So, and you don't have an objection to my taking judicial notice.

MR. LANE: We do not, Your Honor. Public record.

THE COURT: All right. So we've all got August 29th, 2017 as the last -- as the date for the denial.

So the delayed discovery idea, according to what I read,
Mr. Zeleny is indicating that he didn't learn of this
conspiracy that he's identified or averred between the City and
NEA until much later. Although, you did make an allegation
against NEA in your case management conference statement in
back June of 2018. So as of then, you were already focused on
NEA being one of the bad actors here.

MR. ROBINSON: So to address that, I want to raise two points. The first point is under conspiracy doctrine, the statute of limitations runs from the last overt act in connection with the conspiracy. NEA admits in its reply brief that we've alleged at least one overt act that's occurred within the statute of limitations period. Namely, the hearing and denial of Mr. Zeleny's application the final time. And this is another of those issues where we are confronted with

an affirmative defense that we don't think we need to plead around, but I'm happy to fill in the facts.

Zeleny's permit application for a special events permit was denied in this proceeding on August 29th. He submitted a film application in September of 2017, well within the statute of limitations period. Again, Chief Bertini, pursuant to, in our view, the conspiracy with NEA, intercepted his permit application, and has now sat on it since September of 2017. As recently as the deposition and written discovery, the City says: Oh, that's still under consideration; we just don't have enough information to process it.

So it's not only an issue of the ongoing conspiracy. It's an issue of a participant in the conspiracy continuing to take overt acts even after this action was filed.

So it's -- NEA has conflated the idea of last overt act with the idea of last overt act by NEA. If NEA is a party to a conspiracy, the statute against NEA runs from any overt act by any co-conspirator until NEA withdraws. And there's no allegation that it has withdrawn. So the City's continuing to engage in overt acts continues to move the statute of limitations.

And NEA concedes that the August 19 through 29th -- not entirely clear on what date -- but the permit denial that they requested judicial notice of is an overt act, and occurred within the statutory period. So --

THE COURT: Okay. Mr. Lane?

MR. LANE: Your Honor, let me start here, if I may. The plaintiff has known of his core injury here, that NEA is allegedly coordinating with the City to curtail or stop
Mr. Zeleny's protests or least stop them as long as they have guns, for years. Years. In 2011 -- and this is attached to our request -- our request for judicial notice -- NEA disclosed to Mr. Zeleny they had surveilled him. And they had given the City pictures from that surveillance.

Mr. Zeleny in his June, 2018, case management conference which the Court referred to said since at least 2005, NEA has enlisted the help of local authorities, including City, County and Commander Bertini to silence him.

It goes beyond a CMC. In February, 2019, in seeking to support his subpoena to NEA, the plaintiff said under oath that he's been aware of NEA's (As read):

"...alleged past practices of using the legal system, law enforcement and political influence to silence me."

Again --

THE COURT: So that tells us how long, from your perspective, Mr. Zeleny has had it in his mind that NEA is -- is out to get him. But then, according to Mr. Robinson, that conduct continues all the way through; NEA's, in some form or another, complicit in leading up to the denial of

Mr. Zeleny's -- the appeal of his denial, which takes us, according to Mr. Robinson, all the way up through August 29 of 2017.

MR. LANE: So here, Your Honor, I think we need to distinguish between the discovery rule for tolling and the continuing violation rule.

We submit, under the discovery rule, Zeleny has said under oath that he's been aware of NEA trying to work with local authorities to shut him down for years.

THE COURT: Okay, that's the discovery side. And then the continuing violation side, how come -- or why is August of 2017 not another act on a continuum?

MR. LANE: Yes. And the reason is that in 2002, in the Morgan case, the U.S. Supreme Court drastically limited the continuing violation doctrine. It used to be under that doctrine that serial violations against an individual by different people and institutions at different times would toll the running of the statute. Morgan rejected that. And a year later, the Ninth Circuit in Carpinteria applied the Morgan rule to 1983 cases.

And so under that rule, the plaintiff must plead -- to use the continuing violation doctrine at all, the plaintiff must plead a systemic policy or practice of discrimination before and after the limitations period, which must be discriminatory conduct that is widespread throughout a company -- Morgan was

an employment case -- or a routine and regular part of the workplace.

Going on (As read):

"Discrete discriminatory acts by different people at different times and at different institutions do not fall within this doctrine."

And in no way, shape -- and plaintiff's complaint pleads exactly such discrete discriminatory acts.

So under *Morgan*, absent a systemic policy or practice of discrimination within an institution, since we no longer have serial violation doctrine, the continuing violation doctrine has no application under Section 1983. And that is why the plaintiff here cannot use it. Again, quoting *Morgan*:

"Untimely retaliatory or discriminatory acts cannot bootstrap onto timely allegations that are properly before the Court."

THE COURT: Okay, Mr. Robinson.

MR. ROBINSON: Yes, Your Honor. We don't get to the continuing violation doctrine. And the reason we don't get there is the overt act doctrine is a separate doctrine that governs when the cause of action accrues. It's not tolling; it's not a continuing violation. It's: When does the cause of action on a conspiracy claim accrue? And under Federal law under the Gibson case in the Ninth Circuit, the cause of action accrues from the last overt act by any of the

conspirators.

What that means is if you are part of a conspiracy, it could well be that overt acts occurred 15 years ago. But if there are continuing overt acts, a new cause of action runs from each overt act that's part of the conspiracy. If there are overt acts -- this is NEA's argument from its opening brief. Zeleny alleges no overt acts that occurred after March of 2017.

In fact, he does. He alleges the permit denial which we have discussed. He alleges the interception of his film permit in September of 2017. So if there are overt acts within the statutory period, we may not be able to recover for acts outside of the statutory period, but that's not a dismissal issue. That's a what acts come in at trial or on motions. It's not a ground to dismiss the complaint, if we have timely overt acts. And NEA admits in its reply brief there is at least one timely overt act, namely the permit denial. We could allege more.

Frankly, under Ninth Circuit authority, we're not required to plead around their defenses, but they've raised it. We can plead overt acts going into September and beyond.

So the fact that there are overt acts within the statute of limitations period which NEA acknowledges means that we don't get to continuing violation. We don't get to tolling.

We can recover based on those overt acts, even if everything

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else is barred. And those acts are sufficient to state a
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             It's not a dismissal issue.
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     claim.
               THE COURT: Okay.
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                         Your Honor, if I may?
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               MR. LANE:
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               THE COURT: Final comments, go ahead.
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               MR. LANE: Yeah, thank you.
          So if I heard Mr. Robinson correctly, he's saying that all
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     that the plaintiff could proceed on with respect to statute of
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     limitations issues are overt acts that occurred from and after
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     March 29, 2017.
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               THE COURT: Which is the permit denial, and one other
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      thing.
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               MR. LANE:
                         It's only -- the permits were denied in
      2015 and 2016.
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               THE COURT: The appeal.
               MR. LANE: That's just the appeal. And then
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      plaintiff claims there's some ongoing issue with his film
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      permit, which we don't understand.
          But Your Honor, here is what I want to be clear about,
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     because Mr. Robinson was also right when he said: We argue that
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     there is no overt act after that magic date pled in this
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     complaint. And that is true. 139(d) says there were ongoing
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     actions -- there were ongoing discussions that led to a plan.
    As I said, that just means there's a continuing conspiracy.
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     That's not an actionable overt act.
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The plaintiff seeks to amend, he says, to allege that Commander Bertini delayed his appeal period -- his appeal hearing, forgive me -- so that it went into this later period, post-March, 2017. It went to August, 2017. So now it's actionable. Well, I've attached to our reply brief the public record which says that Commander Bertini didn't do that. There was a hearing scheduled for September, 2016, to get this over with. And it says that Mr. Zeleny's counsel -- not Mr. Robinson, Mr. Affeld -- called to postpone it. That's on the public record. And then, for whatever reason, the parties went through forever to get it rescheduled for August 17th. I don't know how the plaintiff can plead that in good faith, that that was Bertini's action when the public record says otherwise, or base any possible claim on it. They had a scheduling snafu. The appeal was denied. That was by the City Council, not a defendant here. It doesn't add up to a claim, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. MR. ROBINSON: Can I very briefly address that? THE COURT: One final-final, yes. The nets are getting smaller. MR. LANE: MR. ROBINSON: Your Honor can take judicial notice of a government action, like a denial. The Court can't take

judicial notice of facts asserted by a defendant.

1 THE COURT: That's true. That is true. So --MR. LANE: It's in the public record, Your Honor. 2 It's not something --3 THE COURT: Well, something in the public record 4 5 doesn't mean everything in a document that's a public record, I can take judicial notice of. I can take judicial notice of 6 a public record being filed on -- that this document was filed 7 on this date, and that type of thing. 8 But it is an overuse of judicial notice to say -- you 9 know, find some 20-page public document, take judicial notice 10 11 of it and everything that's in there is somehow judicially noticeable, which it is not. 12 Now, in this instance, I'll go back and take a look at. 13 So to the extent that Mr. Robinson is suggesting that, for 14 15 example, your point seemed to be who was the party that was prompting the continuance --16 17 MR. LANE: The delay, yes. THE COURT: -- I'm not sure -- I'll go back and look 18 at it -- that that is something that -- if there's a dispute 19 as to who was responsible for that, that is the kind of thing 20 that I might have some trouble taking judicial notice of. 21 22 opposed to: Was there a hearing on X date, I can take 23 judicial notice of that. But, okay. 24 MR. LANE: Okay. 25 THE COURT: I will take the matter under submission,

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and give you an order.
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               MR. ROBINSON: Thank you, Your Honor.
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               MR. LANE: Thank Your Honor.
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               THE COURT: Thank you.
          (Conclusion of Proceedings)
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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, BELLE BALL, Official Reporter for the United States Court, Northern District of California, hereby certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript from the record of proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Bell Ball

/s/ Belle Ball

Belle Ball, CSR 8785, CRR, RDR Wednesday, June 26, 2019